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Abstract 
We show that the system of ‘Grandes écoles’ (GEs) is a key determinant of social 
stratification, low intergenerational mobility at the top and low educational efficiency in 
France. A stylised model of the French higher education system is constructed. This system is 
composed of two types of establishment, the GEs and the universities, which differ (i) in the 
strictness and shape of their admission, and (ii) in their per-student expenditures. The GE 
system is compared with a unified system in which there is one type of establishment only with 
two successive levels and two admission procedures.  
The GE system favours family background at the detriment of personal aptitudes, which 
lessens intergenerational mobility. Rising expenditure on the highest education level favours 
skill upgrading of the population in the unified system whereas it insulate a narrow elite in 
the GE system. With similar education expenditures, the unified system results in higher 
human capital accumulation than the GE system in both the upper skill group and the whole 
population. Consequently, the GE system hurts both social mobility at the top and human 
capital accumulation. The simulations show that the former effect is larger than the latter. 
The US and the UK display tertiary education systems which are close to the GE system in 
terms of selective admission and results. 
Our approach provides theoretical bases for the analysis of selective versus comprehensive 
education systems (Turner, 1960) and a demonstration that highly stratified and selective 
systems reinforce family backgrounds and reduce mobility (Kirckhoff, 1995).      
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper shows that, in contrast with their meritocratic claim, the ‘Grandes écoles’ are key 
determinants of low intergenerational mobility and low educational efficiency in France.  
France is, with the US and the UK, one of the advanced countries in which inter-
generational earnings and skills mobility is the lowest (Corak, 2013) and this mobility is 
particularly low at the top of the earnings distribution (Raitano et al., 2015). In addition, 
recent studies indicate that mobility has fallen in France in the last two decades (Lefranc, 
2011; BenHalima et al., 2014). 
The literature on intergenerational mobility puts forward several determinants.1 By 
definition, a weighty impact of family backgrounds is the key element of low mobility. Costly 
education prevents skill upgrading for children born into modest families, and this limitation 
is magnified when income inequality is high. A reduction in redistribution and in the Welfare 
state tends to erase the pro-mobility impacts of public policies. Finally, deficient primary 
education does not permit to offset the impact of family differences in culture and education.  
When considering the above-mentioned determinants, the fact that intergenerational 
mobility has decreased in France and is comparable to that of the US and the UK is rather 
surprising. First, schooling is freely provided in France in primary, secondary and tertiary 
education. If there are fees in the Grandes écoles, these remain limited compared to the 
universities in the US and the UK, and students from modest families are exempted. Second, 
income inequality has continuously decreased in the seventies and eighties and is now rather 
low in France.
2
 This should have resulted in higher mobility for the generation born since the 
seventies, which is not what has been observed. Third, France can be seen as an exception in 
the backward move of the Welfare state observed in many advanced economies. Finally, the 
only usual explanation that fits with the French case is the role of primary education. France is 
one of the advanced countries in which the per-student expenditure in primary education (in 
percent of GDP per capita) is the lowest. However, countries like Germany and the Nether-
lands display lower public expenditure in primary school without having such a low mobility. 
Finally, the last three PISA OECD surveys (2009, 2012, 2016) reveal the low efficiency of the 
French system in terms of average score and the large gap between the bottom and the top of 
the attainment spectrum.  
                                                 
1
 See section 2 for a broader presentation. 
2
 This does not appear in Corak’s ‘Great Gatsby curve’ (Corak, 2013) because he considers inequality at a 
moment when France was still an inequality-oriented country. 
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One key characteristic of the French education system is the existence of ‘Grandes écoles’ 
(GEs), which are highly selective tertiary establishments that aim at producing the French 
elite. Dudouet & Joly (2010) show that 84% of the top executives of the CAC40 (French 
stock exchange index) are alumni of a GE, 67% of a top GE and 46% from the “3 major”, 
Polytechnique, ENA and HEC.  
The Grandes écoles display several key characteristics. First, they are distinct from the 
universities and the separation between the two occurs right after secondary school. Their 
admission is highly selective and is not based on a minimum human capital level but on a pre-
determined number of intakes that has not increased much over the last decades, whereas the 
number of students admitted in universities has exploded. Finally, their per-student 
expenditure is significantly higher than that of the universities.  
This paper develops an approach which shows that the division of higher education 
between Grandes écoles and universities is a key factor of low intergenerational mobility at 
the top and low educational efficiency in France. A stylised intergenerational model of the 
French higher education system is constructed. This system is composed of two types of 
establishment, GEs and universities, which differ (i) in the strictness and shape of their 
admission procedures, and (ii) in their per-student expenditures. We compare this system with 
a unified two-level higher education system in which there is one type of establishment only, 
universities, that are comprised of two successive levels (U1, U2) with two admission proce-
dures, one at the end of basic education to enter U1, the other at the end of U1 to enter U2.  
First, in the case of equal intakes of students in GEs and U2, the GE system favours family 
backgrounds and the unified system personal aptitudes, which results in lower 
intergenerational mobility in the former. This stems from the early selection to enter the 
highest level in the GE system. Second, higher expenditure on basic education favours 
upward mobility to the entry in both U1 and U2 in the unified system, whereas in the GE 
system it boosts upward mobility to the university but not to the GEs. Third, increasing per-
student expenditure on the highest level (GE or U2) reduces mobility in the GE system 
whereas it increases the intake of students in U2 in the unified system. Finally, when 
assuming similar education expenditures, the unified system results in higher human capital 
attainments in both the upper skill group and the whole population. These results suggest that 
the GE system (i) engenders a narrow self-reproducing elite and lessens thereby inter-
generational mobility, and (ii) could have a negative effect on human capital accumulation. 
Finally, despite the lack of Grandes écoles, the US and the UK display tertiary education 
structures which are close to the GE system in terms of selective admission and budgets.   
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Section 2 summarises the literature on the subject and highlights the characteristics of the 
French higher education system. Section 3 builds the two models of higher education and 
Section 4 describes the related education decision. Section 5 compares these models in terms 
of weight of personal aptitude vs. family background in educational attainment and in terms 
of efficiency. Section 6 compares the model in terms of intergenerational mobility and social 
stratification. We finally discuss our major findings and we conclude in Section 6.  
 
2. Literature and the French higher education system 
 
The approach developed hereafter utilises the economic modelling of human capital 
accumulation and intergenerational mobility to analyse the impacts of the French system of 
higher education characterised by the key role of the Grandes écoles.  
  
2.1. Human capital accumulation and intergenerational mobility 
 
Since the seminal works of Becker (1964), Ben Porah (1967) and Becker & Tomes (1976, 
1979), the economic analysis of human capital accumulation and intergenerational mobility 
has known substantial developments (see the review by Chusseau & Hellier, 2013). From a 
theoretical point of view, the analysis has moved from intergenerational dynamics that 
generate human capital convergence to the exploration of the factors determining lasting 
polarisation in human capital. The empirical literature has been centred on the analysis of the 
determinants of human capital attainment, with a special emphasis on the impact of family 
backgrounds.  
2.1.1. Theoretical approaches 
Becker & Tomes (1979) were the firsts to model the impact of education decisions within an 
intergenerational perspective. They showed that the different dynasties (successive 
generations linked by a parent-child relationship) converge toward the same steady human 
capital, which could be reached after a limited number of generations. In the case of 
imperfections on the credit market, Loury (1981) and Becker & Tomes (1986) showed that 
this convergence is preserved but takes a longer time.  
The subsequent theoretical literature has focused on the factors and mechanisms that could 
explain the persistence of human capital differences and the emergence of different groups 
tending towards different steady human capital levels (polarization). These factors are several. 
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First, Galor & Zeira (1993) and Barham et al. (1995) showed that imperfections on the credit 
market (with a fixed cost of education in the former) hamper children from low income and 
low cultural background families to pursue further education. Second, an S-shaped education 
function can generate human capital polarization with a high skilled and a low skilled group 
(Galor & Tsiddon, 1997).3.Third, neighbourhood effects, peer effects and local externalities 
can considerably slow down the convergence of human capital or even create under-education 
traps (Benabou, 1993, 1994, 1996; Durlauf, 1994, 1996). Such traps can also emerge from 
differences in altruism across families (Das, 2007). A last explanation for social segmentation 
and low intergenerational mobility can be found in the very structure of education systems. 
The economic analysis of the relations between the structure of education systems, social 
stratification and intergenerational mobility is rather recent. Key issues are the influences of 
the division of education between several levels and cycles, and of the funding allowed for 
each of them, on inequality, social stratification and welfare. Driskill & Horowitz (2002) and 
Su (2004) analysed the impact of the allocation of public funding between basic and further 
education upon growth, welfare and income distribution. Bertocchi & Spagat (2004) 
generated social stratification at the different stages of economic development from a model 
with basic and secondary education, the latter being divided into vocational and general 
studies. Su (2006) showed that the upper class in developing countries imposes larger 
expenditure on higher education for a minority at the expense of basic education, whereas 
public allocation to education is more balanced in developed countries. From an 
intergenerational model with three education cycles (basic education, vocational studies and 
university) Chusseau & Hellier (2011) generate different social stratifications with under-
education traps depending on the public funding allocated to each cycle and on the strictness 
of admission. Su et al. (2012) distinguish between standard and elite colleges to analyse the 
U-shape relationship between wages and skills observed in the US in the last two decades. 
From a calibrated overlapping generation model, Herrington (2015) shows that differences in 
public spending and in public contribution to early childhood education are key determinants 
of the divergence in inequality and intergenerational mobility between the US and Norway. 
The crucial role of early childhood education and of its financing are emphasised by 
Restuccia & Urrutia (2004) and Blankenau & Youderian (2015).  
As regards higher education, its twofold objective of training and signalling was initially 
highlighted by Arrow (1973), Spence (1973) and Stiglitz (1975). A number of works have 
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 In Galor & Tsiddon (1997), this polarization is however transitional.  
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been devoted to the analysis of higher education costs and the way to avoid their crowding-
out effect on modest families (e.g., Caucutt & Kumar, 2003, Akyol & Athreya, 2005, Gilboa 
& Justman, 2009). Another strand of literature has focused on the tightness of admission and 
selection procedures. Gary-Bobo & Trannoy (2008) explain the concomitance of admission 
rules and tuition fees by double-sided asymmetric information in the university enrolment 
process. Distinguishing admission requirements from graduation requirements, Gilboa & 
Justman (2005) showed that a more lenient admission without change in graduation 
requirements promotes earnings equality but reduces intergenerational mobility. This result is 
obtained within a model where personal ability combines family backgrounds and a random 
component. By disentangling family backgrounds and i.i.d. innate personal abilities, Brezis & 
Hellier (2013) show that, within a two-tier higher education with standard and elite 
universities, highly selective admission to elite establishments results in permanent social 
stratification with low intergenerational mobility and large self-reproduction of the upper 
class. Finally, to our knowledge, no theoretical model of the French system of ‘Grandes 
écoles’ has been proposed so far. 
In contrast with the economic theory, sociology has for a long time analysed the impact of 
education systems upon social structures, stratification and mobility. These analyses were 
initiated in the early XXth century by Durkheim and Weber. We mention here a limited 
number of works which are relevant for the approach developed in this paper.  
An essential distinction is made by Turner (1960) between comprehensive education 
systems that bring a large proportion of children to the education level necessary to integrate 
the highest positions, and selective systems that recruit a limited number of the best students 
to enter the upper class. In the same vein, Hopper (1968) distinguishes different levels of 
education stratification based on the selection and differentiation processes.  
Kerckhoff (1995) suggests that the impact of family backgrounds could be magnified when 
the education system is highly stratified and selective. This argument has been confirmed by a 
number of empirical works (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2006; Marks et al., 2006; Pfeffer, 
2008; Dunne, 2010; Dronkers et al., 2011). Based on the PISA surveys, most of these 
analyses are however centred on the education system up to secondary school. 
The above-mentioned sociological literature focuses on school differentiation and 
admission selectivity as key elements of the elite self-reproduction, and therefore of mobility 
at the top of the social ladder. The model developed in this paper tackles similar issues.  
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2.1.2. Empirical works 
There is a large empirical literature on intergenerational mobility.4 We shall limit our brief 
presentation to the main methods and the key findings of these works.  
As regards the measurement of intergenerational mobility, two major methods have 
typically been utilised by economists and sociologists.  
Following Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), the first is based on the calculation of the 
elasticity of earnings or education levels of individuals relative to their parents. This 
calculation determines the intergenerational elasticity   (IGE) and the intergenerational 
correlation, which are the most utilised indicators in the economic literature.5  
On top of IGEs, sociologists often utilise mobility tables. These are based on the division 
of the population between different groups (earnings deciles, education levels, social classes, 
etc.) and mobility is measured by the probability to switch groups from one generation to the 
next. The mobility matrix  ija  depicts the proportion of individuals in group i with parents in 
group j. One indicator usually calculated from mobility matrices is the odds ratio.  
Even if the two types of measurement are different in their construction and interpretation, 
they lead to the same general diagnosis as regards intergenerational mobility: 
1) In all countries, family backgrounds have a significant impact on earnings and education  
2) The impact of family backgrounds, and thereby intergenerational mobility, considerably 
differs across countries (Corak, 2013; Blanden, 2013). In advanced countries, Italy, the UK, 
the US and France display the highest IGEs (between 0.4 and 0.5 for income), which indicates 
low intergenerational mobility. In contrast, Scandinavian countries and Canada have the 
lowest elasticities (between 0.15 and 0.25) and thus a rather high mobility.  
3) Intergenerational mobility is lower at the top of income distribution, and this difference 
is substantial in France (Raitano et al., 2015), the US and the UK (Björklund et al., 2012, for 
both countries; Chetty et al., 2014a, for the US; Blanden & Macmillan, 2014 for the UK). 
4) Several works suggest that intergenerational mobility has decreased in the last decade in 
France (Lefranc, 2011, and Ben-Halima et al., 2014), but also in the US and the UK. 6  
                                                 
4
 Reviews of this literature can be found in Solon (1999), Bjorklund & Jantti (2000, 2009), Fields (2008), Causa 
& Johansson (2009), Black & Devereux (2011), and Chusseau & Hellier (2013). 
5
 Some works also calculate the rank-rank slope (slope of the relation that binds the rank of children to that of 
their parents. E.g., Chetty et al., (2014a). 
6
 Aaronson & Mazumder, 2008, for the US; Blanden et al., 2004, 2007, and Nicoletti & Ermisch, 2007, for the 
UK. In contrast, Breen & Golthorpe (1999, 2001) found no change in mobility in the UK between cohorts born 
in 1958 and 1970. Chetty et al. (2014b) found no decrease in intergenerational earnings mobility in the US, for 
cohorts born between 1971 and 1993. In addition, the impact of family income has increased in both the US 
(Belley & Lochner, 2007) and France (Ben-Halima et al., 2014) 
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Finally, it can be noted that the latter three countries are characterised by elitist tertiary 
education systems, wherein a limited number of prestigious establishments select a feebly 
increasing number of students while standard universities have considerably augmented their 
intakes. This is particularly the case in France with the system of Grandes écoles. 
2.2. The French higher education and the ‘Grandes écoles’ 
 
Even if the French higher education has experienced a succession of reforms that have 
considerably modified its structure and size since World War II, the existence of Grandes 
écoles which integrate a limited number of students with highly selective admissions is a 
persistent characteristic of this system.  
The French higher education can be broadly divided into three types of study which all 
necessitate the prior obtaining of the baccalauréat (‘bac’).7 
Short vocational studies (BTS, DUT, DEUST) deliver purely professional and technical 
degrees that are obtained in two years. There is a selection to entry and the two-year degree 
can now be extended to a third year sanctioned by a vocational bachelor level. 
The University is opened to anyone having obtained the bac and is comprised of three 
cycles. The licence (bachelor’s level) is obtained after 3 years, followed by the master (2 
years) which can give access to the doctorat (PhD, 3 years). There are exams to pass from one 
year to the next, with additional admission procedures to enter the master level and to register 
at the doctorat level. About one third of the students entering the university are eliminated 
after one or two years at the licence level. 
The Grandes écoles are highly selective tertiary establishments that aim at producing the 
French elite. Even if the first Grande école was created in the late XVIth century, their 
development goes back to the French revolution and nineteenth century with the creation of 
the major Grandes écoles d’ingénieurs. Their purpose was to provide the state and the country 
with highly skilled specialists necessary for economic and military purposes.   
The creation of the Grandes écoles was initially justified by the promotion of meritocracy 
and personal aptitudes. A lightening example is that of l’ENA (Ecole Nationale 
d’Administration), which was created after World War II to escape from a situation in which 
the appointment to the highest public positions was discretionarily decided by politicians 
through personal links. The basic idea was that anonymous exams erase social, personal and 
                                                 
7
 Medical studies, architecture, accounting studies and a few other fields have specific shapes. The baccalauréat 
is the final degree that sanctions the completion of secondary school. Presently, about 70% of a generation obtain 
one of the 3 types of bac (general, technical and professional), whereas they were about 15% fifty years ago.  
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family determinants and favours capacities and work. In addition, by limiting the amount of 
admissions to the amount of available positions, this should prevent the restoration of 
personal links in the filling of posts among the admitted candidates.  
There are now two major types of GEs, business schools and engineering schools, both 
leading to top executive positions. In addition, ‘Science Po’ and l’ENA aim at training high 
level civil servants, and the ENS (Ecole Normale Supérieure) top researchers.  
The GEs display two essential characteristics. First, their admission is highly selective and 
operates through concours. This means that each GE decides for its number N of intakes and 
the N candidates with the highest marks at the entry exam can join the GE. Hence, admission 
is not based on a minimum level, but on a pre-determined number of intakes. The normal way 
to integrate a GE is to enter first a ‘classe préparatoire’ that prepares the candidates to the 
exams during two years (typically more because few are admitted the first time they apply). 
The classes préparatoires are themselves very selective. This selective procedure has 
permitted to maintain a narrow number of intakes in the GEs whereas the number of students 
in tertiary education has been multiplied by more than 3 since the early seventies in France. 
From a true sample of the French employed population, BenHalima et al. (2014) find that 
those with a GE degree moved from 2.78 percent in 1977 to 2.82 percent in 2003, whereas 
those with a tertiary education degree (higher than the bac) increased from 12 to 31 percent. 
This recruitment is even tighter when considering the most prestigious GEs. Albouy & 
Wanecq (2003) define the ‘Très Grandes écoles’ (Top GEs), which are the most prestigious 
leading to the highest top executive and public positions. They show that, for men, the share 
of a generation entering a top GE decreased from 0.8 for the generations born between 1929 
and 1938 to 0.6% for those born between 1959 and 1968. For the same generations, the share 
of those entering a grande école (but not a top one) increased from 2.3% to 3.2%, and the 
share of those completing tertiary education was multiplied by more than 3.5. 
The second specificity of the GEs is the level of their per-student expenditures, which is 
significantly higher than that of universities. There are to our knowledge no yearly 
standardised data permitting to compare per-student expenditure in the GEs and the 
universities. We however have data on per-student expenditures for several GEs that can be 
compared to per-student expenditures in universities published every year by the French 
ministry of education. The Observatoire Boivigny8 reports that, in 2002, the per-student 
budget is of 50,380 Euro for the Ecole des Mines, 50,000 Euro for the ENA, 24,000 Euro for 
                                                 
8
 http://www.boivigny.com/Le-budget-des-etablissements_a25.html 
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HEC (a major business school), 19,000 Euro for the Ecole Centrale Paris, 12,600 Euro for 
Sciences-Po Paris, against less than 7000 Euro on average in universities. In 2013, the first 20 
engineering GEs reported by l’Usine Nouvelle 9 gather 19,300 students with an average per-
student expenditure of 48,500 Euro (respectively 65,136 students and 33,800 Euro for the first 
fifty), against 1.5 million students and a per student expenditure of 11,000 Euro in 
Universities (MENESR DEPP/ Compte de l'éducation). Even if those data are not fully 
standardised, the differences are substantial and indicate per-student expenditures that are at 
least three times higher in the GEs compared to the universities.  
In the stylised model built in the next section, we shall focus on the two major types of 
tertiary establishments, namely, the universities and the GEs. We shall consequently assume 
that the French GE system of higher education is composed of two branches that differ in 
their admission procedures and budgets.  
 
3. The model 
 
The approach aims at comparing the GE system with a two-level unified higher education 
system. We therefore model each system and analyse their respective impacts on 
intergenerational mobility and educational efficiency.  
In the GE system, there are two types of establishments, Grandes écoles and universities, 
with different admission procedures which both take place at the end of basic education. In 
addition, the per-student expenditure is higher in the GEs. 
The benchmark to which the GE system is compared is a two-level unified higher 
education system. Contrary to the GE system, this structure is comprised of one type of 
establishment only, universities, but these have two levels, U1 and U2. Hence, there is a top 
level in the unified system as well, but the admission to the top is based on the human capital 
at the end of the first level U1 which is common to everyone admitted in tertiary education. 
We assume overlapping generations with each individual having one child, and a constant 
number of dynasties (successive generations linked by a parent-child relationship) normalised 
to 1. The dynasties are initially (generation 0) continuously distributed over a bounded human 
capital interval. The individual of the t-th generation of dynasty i is denoted ‘individual (i,t)’.  
Individuals accumulate human capital through education, and education is comprised of 
two phases, i.e., basic and higher education.   
                                                 
9
 http://www.usinenouvelle.com/comparatif-des-ecoles-d-ingenieurs-2013 
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Being young (child), all individuals receive the same basic education and their needs are 
provided by their parents. At the end of basic education, individual (i,t) has accumulated a 
human capital level denoted Bith  and she becomes an adult. She then lives one period of time 
and chooses whether to pursue further education or to join directly the labour market.  
When completing her overall education (basic education or one of the higher education 
opportunities described below), individual (i,t) possesses the final human capital level ith . 
Then, she spends the whole of her remaining time working. 
Prior to education decisions, individuals are heterogeneous and they differ in two respects: 
1) Their family backgrounds which encompass the influence of intra-family human capital 
externalities and transfers and act through several channels: intra-family direct transmission of 
human capital, intra-family transmission of capacity to learn, information about the best 
education strategy, affiliation with influential networks etc. All these intra-family externalities 
and transfers are directly linked to the parent's human capital 1ith  .  
2) Their personal innate aptitude
10
, ita  for individual (i,t), which are independent from 
family backgrounds (Maoz & Moav, 1999, and Lochner, 2004 for models with the same 
assumption) and randomly distributed across individuals within each generation inside the 
segment   *,a a
 . 
In summary, the couple of attributes (family background, personal aptitude), i.e.  1,it ith a ,  
fully defines individual (i,t), and her education decision will be based on these attributes, on 
the cost of education and on the shape of the education system.     
3.1. Basic education 
The State provides all individuals with basic education. The individual's human capital at the 
end of basic education, Bith , depends on three elements: 1) her family background 1ith  ; 2) her 
personal innate aptitude ita ; 3) the public expenditure on basic education, which is depicted 
by coefficient B , assumed to be proportional to the per-pupil public expenditure. 
The human capital at the end of basic education Bith  is given by the function: 
1( )
B
B it itith a h
   ,          with  0 1  ,  0 1      (1) 
 
 
                                                 
10
 We select the tem ‘aptitude’ rather than ‘ability’ because, in a number of works, ability encompasses both the 
family backgrounds and a randomly distributed element (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986; Gradstein et al., 2005). 
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3.2. Two higher education systems 
We consider two systems of higher education.  
In the first called ‘GE system’, there are two types of establishments, GEs (G) and 
universities (U), with two different admission procedures that both take place at the end of 
basic education. In addition, the per-student expenditure is higher in GEs than in universities.  
The second higher education structure is called ‘unified system’ and characterised by one 
type of establishment only, universities. Universities do not differ in their quality but they 
combine two successive levels of studies. There is one admission procedure at the end of 
basic education to enter the university level 1 (U1), and an additional admission procedure at 
the end of level 1 to enter level 2 (U2). We finally assume to simplify that the time spent in 
higher education is institutionally determined, and this time is 1  for the university in the GE 
system and for U1 in the united system, and 2  for a GE and for achieving U2, with 2 1  . 
There are thus two levels in each system. The lower level is university in the GE system 
and U1 in the unified system, and the higher level is G in the GE system and U2 in the unified 
one. In both systems, the education functions that define the human capital achievement at the 
end of each level depend on three determinants:  
1) The human capital attained by the individual at the end of basic education. 
2) The individual’s personal aptitude. 
3) The public expenditure on the type of higher education, ,    , , 1, 2.j j G U U U    
3.2.1. The GE system: Grandes écoles versus Universities 
The GE system is a simplified and stylised model of the French higher education structure.  
There are two types of establishments, Grandes écoles and Universities. 
Given the low tuition fees in the French tertiary education, we suppose that the only cost of 
further studies is the opportunity cost linked to the time spent in higher education. 
To enter the university, a child must have a minimal human capital h  at the end of basic 
education.   
To enter a GE, on top of having the minimal human capital h , one must belong to the 
1   children with the highest human capital at the end of basic education. We suppose that 
  is sufficiently small so that a limited number of children among those having attained h  at 
the end of basic education can enter a GE.   
Let us rank the children by increasing order of human capital at the end of basic education. 
Then, there is at each generation t a unique human capital value ,th  such that there are   
13 
 
children with a human capital higher than or equal to ,th , and hence 1   children with a 
human capital below ,th , at the end of basic education.  
The education functions for each level of the GE system are: 
  11 BU it itUit ah h   ,  if individual (i,t) enters the University  (2) 
  11 BG it itGit ah h   ,  if individual (i,t) enters a GE    (3) 
where ,  ,j j U G  , depicts the quality of  the j-study, which is directly and positively related 
to the per-student expenditure on each type of education. 
In line with the observed facts exposed in Section 2, we assume that the per-student 
expenditure is higher in the GE than in the university: G U  . 
Functions (2) and (3) indicate that, on top of the human capital acquired in basic education 
B
ith , higher education j brings the additional human capital 
1
1( )
B
j it it j B it ita h a h
     . This 
additional skill depends on the already acquired human capital Bith , on the quality of the j-
education j , and  on the individual’s aptitude ita . As a consequence, aptitude has a higher 
relative impact in human capital creation in higher education than in basic education only.  
3.2.2. The two-level unified higher education  
In the unified higher education, the university is divided into the successive two levels U1 and 
U2. As previously, the admission to the first level is conditioned by a minimal human capital 
attainment h  at the end of basic education. In addition, to be admitted in level 2, a student 
must have achieved a minimal human capital h  at the conclusion of the first level of 
university, U1. The related education functions are: 
  111 1 BU it itUit ah h   ,   if individual (i,t) attends U1   (4) 
  2 11 2( )1 BUU U it itith a h   ,  if individual (i,t) attends U2   (5) 
 
The interpretation of functions (4) and (5) is similar to that of functions (2) and (3). 
 
4. Education choice 
 
We firstly determine the individual’s optimal choice without the admission constraints. We 
subsequently introduce the admission rules to determine the individual’s final decision.  
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4.1. Optimal choice without admission constraint 
Once they have achieved basic education, individuals possess one unit of time they can 
allocate to working and higher education. 
Individuals maximise their lifetime income, which depends on their human capital, on 
earnings per unit of human capital, and on their working time over their life. We denote tw  
the (after-tax) earnings per unit of human capital at the beginning of generation t’s adult life. 
To simplify, we assume an exogenous and constant rate of growth   of unit earnings.  
Consider individual (i,t) with human capital Bith  at the end of basic education. If she joins 
directly the labour market, her lifetime earnings are 
1 ( )
0
B r B
it t itI w e h d
    , where r is the 
discount factor. In the GE system, her lifetime earnings is 
1
1 ( ) 1(1 )U r Bit t U it itI w e a h d
  

     
if she enters a university and 
2
1 ( ) 1(1 )G r Bit t G it itI w e a h d
  

      if she enters a GE. In the 
unified system, her lifetime earnings is 
1
11 ( ) 1
1(1 )
U r B
it t U it itI w e a h d
  

      if she enters U1 
only and  
2
12 ( ) 1
1 2(1 )
U r B
it t U U it itI w e a h d
  

       if she pursues both U1 and U2.  
 
Lemma 1: In the GE system: 
1) There is a threshold value of aptitude Ua  such that individual (i,t) prefers basic 
education only to the university iif it Ua a , and prefers the university iif it Ua a . 
2) There is a threshold value of aptitude Ga  such that individual (i,t) prefers the GE to the 
university iif it Ga a , and prefers the university to the GE iif it Ga a . 
3) There is a threshold value of aptitude /G Ba  such that individual (i,t) prefers basic 
education only to the GE iif /it G Ba a , and prefers basic education only  to GE iif
/it G Ba a . 
 
Proof. Appendix A. The values Ua , Ga  and /G Ba  are determined in Appendix A and it is 
shown that 0U
U
a




, 0G
G
a




, 0G
U
a




 and / 0G B
G
a




. 
It can be easily verified that, for any 2 1( , )   such that 2 11 0    , there is a unique 
value ˆ 1d    of the ratio /G Ud    such that 
ˆ
U Gd d a a    and 
ˆ
U Gd d a a   . The 
case G Ua a   corresponds to a high human capital gain of G compared to the extra time spent 
in education when attending G (high /G U   compared to 2 1  ). In this case, it is only the 
tighter admission to G that prevents all the students to enter G at the end of U1. 
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Lemma 2: In the unified system: 
1) There is a threshold value of aptitude 1Ua  such that individual (i,t) prefers basic 
education only to U1 iif 1it Ua a , and prefers U1 iif 1it Ua a . 
2) There is a threshold value of aptitude 2Ua   such that individual (i,t) prefers U1  to U2 iif 
2it Ua a , and prefers U2 to U1 iif 2it Ua a . 
3) There is a threshold value of aptitude 2/U Ba   such that individual (i,t) prefers basic 
education only to U2 iif 2/it U Ba a , and prefers U2 iif 2/it U Ba a . 
 
Proof. Appendix A.  The values 1Ua , 2Ua  and 2/U Ba  are determined in Appendix A and it is 
shown that  1
1
0U
U
a




, 2
1
0U
U
a




, 2
2
0U
U
a




, 2/
1
0U B
U
a




, and 2/
2
0U B
U
a




. 
As in the case of the GE system, there is a unique value ˆ 'd   of the ratio 2 1/U U   such that 
1 2U Ua a  when 2 1/U U   is below this value and 1 2U Ua a  when the ratio is above. The 
interpretation of this feature is the same as for the GE system.   
Lemma 1 and 2 determine the aptitude constraints on the entry to each higher education 
level, in which the individuals’ decision depends on its personal aptitude. 
 
4.2. Admission constraints and final decision 
 
Let us now consider the additional constraints linked to the admission rules. 
Study-j admission rule is effective if there are children who wish to pursue the study j and 
are not admitted. We shall henceforth suppose that all the admission rules are effective. 
Otherwise, the admission rules would have no impact. 
The admission rule to study j is fully determining if (i) it is effective and (ii) all the 
individuals who are admitted wish to pursue j.  In this case, we can ignore the individuals’ 
education choice and make as if the entry in study j is fully determined by the admission rule.   
If Ua a , then ,  ,it Ua a it   and everyone prefer the university to basic education only. 
Then the admission rule Bith h  is fully determining. If Ua a , then ,  it Ua a it  , and 
everyone prefer basic education only to the university. Then, the admission rule Bith h  is not 
effective since no one wants enter the university. This case is inappropriate by assumption.  
In what follows, we shall consider the most usual case in which Ua a a   and 1Ua a a  . 
Individual (i,t) wishes to enter the university if it Ua a  and she is admitted if 
B
ith h . So, 
there are both individuals who wish to enter the university ( it Ua a ) and are not admitted 
16 
 
( )Bith h ) and individuals who could be admitted (
B
ith h ) but do not enter the university 
( )it Ua a . The latter combine a high family background with a low aptitude. 
a) GE system 
To wish to attend the university and be admitted, one must combine an aptitude it Ua a  and 
a human capital at the end on basic education  
1/ /
1 /
B
it it B ith h h h a
      . The relation 
 
1/ /
1 ( ) /it U it B ith A a h a
       defines the admission function to the university in the GE 
system. In the map ( 1,it ita h  ), all individuals located above the admission curve ( )U itA a  fulfil 
the admission condition to enter the university, and all those below cannot enter the 
university. 
The number of children admitted to the GE is  . We shall further assume that all the 
individuals who are admitted to a GE at the end of basic education do enter a GE, i.e., that the 
conditions Ga a  and /G Ba a  are fulfilled for all the individuals who belong to the best   
in terms of human capital at the end of basic education. Given the very limited amount of 
students selected at the entry of the GEs, this assumption is justified. Hence, all the 
individuals with a basic education  
1/ /
, 1 , /
B
it t it t B ith h h h a
  
  

    enter a GE. The relation 
 
1/ /
1 ,( ) /it G it t B ith A a h a
  
 

    defines the admission function to the GE. In the map 
 1,it ita h  , all individuals located above the admission curve ( )G itA a  fulfil the admission 
condition and enter the GE, and all those below cannot enter the GE. 
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of individuals (defined by their attributes 1( , )it ith a ) in 
generation t between the three types of study (basic education only, university and GE).
11
 The 
parents’ human capital (generation t-1) is distributed between min1th  and 
max
1th  . The admission 
curve UA  separates the individuals who fulfil the admission to the university (above UA ) 
from those who do not (below UA ). Similarly, the admission curve GA  separates the 
individuals who fulfil the admission threshold to the GE (above GA ) from those who do not 
(below GA ). As all the admitted enter the GE, the lowest aptitude of the students who can 
enter the GE is higher than .Ga   
   
                                                 
11
 We limit our presentation to the case 
G U
a a , the analysis of case 
G U
a a  being similar.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of students in the GE system 
 
In Figure 1, the dotted surface depicts the set of individuals who do not enter tertiary 
education ( it Ua a  and/or 
B
ith h ), the dimmed surface those who enter the university 
( it Ua a  and 
B
ith h h  ), and the lined surface depicts those who enter a GE (
B
ith h ).  
b) Unified system 
In the unified system, the conditions for an individual to attend U1 are similar to those for 
attending the university in the GE system. She must firstly wish to enter U1 and secondly 
attain a human capital higher than h . However, individuals may dislike U1 and nevertheless 
wish to enter U1 because this is a prerequisite to enter U2. This is the case when the 
individual’s preference is (  means ‘is preferred to’): 2 1U B U . Two cases can thus be 
distinguished, namely, 1 2/ 2U U B Ua a a   and 2 2/ 1U U B Ua a a  . 
As in the GE system, the admission rules define two admission functions with their related 
curves. The admission function to U1, 1( )A a , is identical to ( )UA a  in the GE system: 
 
1/ /
1( ) / BA a h a
    . The admission function to U2 is different because the admission 
threshold h  applies to the human capital attainment at the end of U1. To be admitted to U2, 
individual (i,t) must fulfil the condition 1Uith h , i.e. 
1/
/
1 1
1
/
1
B
it it
U it
h
h a
a

 




 
 
  
  
 because 
of the education function U1. This defines the admission function 1 2( )it ith A a   with 
1/
/
2 1
1
/
( )
1
B
U
h
A a a
a

 

 

 
 
 
 . Both curves 1( )itA a  and 2( )itA a  being drawn in the map 
1( , )it ita h  , the individuals above curve 1A  (resp. 2A ) are admitted to U1 (resp. U2), and all 
those below 1A  (resp. 2A ) are not admitted to U1 (resp. U2).  
 
  
  Grande école 
  
  
  
  
  
    
optimal choice:  
Basic education only     
  University 
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Figure 2 depicts the distribution of individuals between the different studies for 
1 2/ 2U U B Ua a a  . The case 2 2/ 1U U B Ua a a   is in Appendix B. The dotted surface depicts 
the set of individuals who do not enter the university ( 1it Ua a  and/or 
B
ith h ), the dimmed 
surface those who attend U1 only 1 2( U it Ua a a  , 
B
ith h  and 
1U
ith h ), and the lined surface 
depicts those who enter U2 ( Bith h and 2it Ua a ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of students in the unified system with 
1 2/ 2U U B Ua a a   
 
Figures 1 and 2 depict the individuals’ final educational attainments resulting from their 
choice subject to three constraints: the education functions, the education (opportunity) cost 
and the admission rules. In both education systems, these educational choices distribute the 
individuals in three skill groups (SGs): 
 
Definition 1. We call:  
1) Low skill group (low SG) the individuals who have a basic education only. 
2) Middle skill group (middle SG) the individuals who have a university (in the GE 
system) or a U1 (in the unified system) degree. 
3) Upper skill group (upper SG) the individuals who have a GE (in the GE system) or a U2 
(in the unified system) degree.  
 
It can be highlighted that two types of effects determine the individuals’ educational 
achievement and social group membership. The incentive effect governs the aptitude 
constraint, i.e., the individual’s choice regardless of the admission rules; the admission effect 
determines the selection to entry in the different types of studies regardless of the individuals’ 
personal choices.    
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5. Aptitude, family background and educational attainment 
 
The purpose of this section is to compare the GE system and the unified system as regards 
two major outcomes, i.e., (i) the respective weights of personal aptitude and family 
backgrounds in educational attainment and (ii) the human capital of the whole population and 
of the upper skill group. The results exposed here are valid at any generation. They thereby 
concern both the short term and the longer term.     
 
5.1. Personal aptitude vs. family backgrounds 
 
We analyse the respective impact of personal aptitude and family background on the capacity 
to attain the highest level, i.e., G in the GE system and U2 in the unified system. This 
restriction to the case of the highest level is logical provided that the only structural difference 
between the two systems is the admission rule to this level.  
 
Definition 2. Consider two stratified education systems, S1 and S2, both comprising a basic 
education and a two-tier tertiary education with a lower and a higher level, with the same 
number of admitted to the higher level, and which only differ in their admission rules to 
enter the higher level.
12
 Then, by assuming a given cross-distribution (personal aptitude, 
family background) between individuals: 
1) System S1 is strictly aptitude-biased compared to S2 if all the students admitted to the 
higher level in S1 and not in S2 have a greater personal aptitude ita  than all the students 
admitted to the higher level in S2 and not in S1. 
2) System S1 is strictly family-biased compared to S2 if all the students admitted to the 
higher level in S1 and not in S2 have a greater family background 1ith   than all the 
students admitted to the higher level in S2 and not in S1. 
 
Our definitions of the aptitude and family biases are very strict. A less restrictive approach 
could define the aptitude (family) bias as a situation in which the ordered vector of aptitudes 
(family background) of students admitted to the higher level in S1 is greater than the ordered 
vector of aptitudes (family backgrounds) of students admitted to the higher level in S2. An 
even less restrictive definition could be based on the average aptitude (family background) in 
each set of admitted students. In our definition, S1 is aptitude-biased (family-biased) 
compared to S2 if its adoption entails that all the new admitted possess a greater aptitude 
(family background) than the most able of the students they replace.    
                                                 
12
 This signifies that (i) the education functions are the same, (ii) the expenditures on each study are identical, 
and  (iii) the admission rule to the lower level of tertiary education is the same, in both systems. 
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Proposition 1. The Unified system is strictly aptitude-biased compared to the GE system, and 
the GE system is strictly family-biased compared to the unified system.  
 
Proof. Appendix C. 
 
The combination of both findings described in Proposition 1 shows that, for similar 
admission tightness (same h  and same number of intakes in G and U2) and similar 
expenditures (same B , 1U U   and 1 2G U U    ), the GE system favours family 
background at the expense of personal aptitude whereas the unified system favours personal 
aptitude at the expense of family backgrounds, for the entry to the highest level. These 
findings directly derive from the early selection to the highest level in the GE system. This is 
because personal aptitude has a larger effect on the students’ ranking at the end of U1  than at 
the end of basic education. 
 
5.2. Human capital level and efficiency 
 
So as to focus on the sole divergence in structure between the two systems, i.e., on the impact 
of the difference in the shape of admission to the highest level (G and U2), we shall assume: 
1. Similar admission tightness (same h and same intakes in G and U2) in both systems.  
2. Similar expenditures in both systems (same B , 1U U   and 1 2G U U    ).  
3. An identical cross-distribution of the attributes (personal aptitude, family background) 
across individuals. 
  
Proposition 2. Assume similar admission tightness and similar expenditures in both systems, 
and an identical cross-distribution of attributes 1( , )it ita h   between individuals. Then:  
1) The individuals in the upper SG have a higher human capital in the unified system than 
in the GE system. 
2) The total (and average) human capital level is higher in the unified system than in the 
GE system. 
 
Proof. Appendix D. 
 
Proposition 2 shows that, with similar admission tightness and expenditures, the GE 
system does not only lower the total human capital attainment, but it also lessens the human 
capital attainment of the upper skill group. As these results are obtained by assuming identical 
expenditures, this leads to the diagnosis that, compared to the unified system, the GE system 
is inefficient in terms of both the general human capital attainment of the economy and the 
human capital attainment of the most skilled. It should be noted that, once again, this 
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inefficiency results from the early selection which characterises the GE system. As the 
admission to the GE is decided at the end of basic education, some student with a high 
aptitude and a rather low family background are rejected from the GE albeit they would reach 
higher human capital at the end of the GE study than some admitted who have a lower 
aptitude and higher family background.   
 
6. Stratification and Mobility 
 
We shall successively analyse (i) the impact of each higher education system on the mobility 
between skill groups, and (ii) the impacts of structural shifts (in admission rules and 
expenditures) on between-group mobility and the size of each skill group. In the latter 
analysis, we make a difference between the short term and the longer term. The short term 
approach considers the generation in which the shift is implemented and the longer term 
approach analyses the characteristics of the long term stratification generated by education 
systems. This distinction is necessary because structural shifts do not impact family 
backgrounds in the short term but they do in the longer term. In addition, we shall focus on 
the sole structural shifts which lead to notably different outcomes in the two systems.  
6.1. Education systems and between-group mobility 
We call upward mobility the number of moves from one skill group to another skill group 
with higher human capital attainment, and downward mobility the opposite number of moves. 
As the number of individuals per generation is given and normalised to 1, the number of 
moves also depicts the percentage of each move in one generation’s population.  
As previously, we suppose similar admission tightness (same h  and same number of 
intakes in G and U2) and similar expenditures (same B , 1U U   and 1 2G U U    ) in 
both systems, and an identical cross-distribution of the attributes between individuals. We 
finally suppose that upward mobility exists at least in the unified system.
13
 The following 
proposition can then be established: 
 
Proposition 3. The unified system generates more upward mobility to the upper skill group 
and more downward mobility from the upper skill group than the GE system.   
Proof. Appendix D.   
                                                 
13
 If there is no upward mobility in the unified system, the lack of mobility also applies to the GE system and the 
systems only differ in the respective weights of aptitude and family background in their intakes of students. 
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Proposition 3 indicates that more children from the low and middle SG enter the upper SG 
and thereby more children from the upper skill group move downwards (since the intakes of 
students in the highest level is given) in the unified system compared to the GE system. In 
addition, all the individuals who benefit from upward mobility in the GE system also move 
upwards in the unified system. Hence, social mobility at the top is clearly strengthened in the 
unified system. This is a logical consequence of Proposition 1: as the GE system fosters 
family backgrounds for the access to the highest level, it ipso facto lessens mobility. Finally, 
as mobility between the low and the middle skill groups is the same in both system (because 
we have assumed similar admission tightness and expenditures), the unified system results in 
higher between-group mobility.  
6.2. Structural shifts in the short term 
We analyse the influence of structural shifts in the short term, i.e., on the first generation 
which is impacted. Consequently, family backgrounds are given and they are not modified by 
the shifts. Note that, with structural shifts, the assumption of equal intakes of students in the 
highest level of tertiary education must be waived because the shifts modify the intakes.  
There are five possible structural shifts, two related to the admission rules and three to the 
expenditures on each type of study. We shall however focus on the only shifts the impact of 
which significantly differs between the two systems in the short term, i.e., changes in the 
expenditure on basic education B  and on the lower level of tertiary education ( U or 1U ). 
The analysis of changes in the other characteristics is available from the author upon request. 
We can then establish the following two propositions (proofs in Appendix E) which will be 
discussed in Section 7: 
 
Proposition 4. An increase in the per-student expenditure on basic education B  entails: 
1) In both systems: an increase in the upward mobility of children from the low SG to the 
middle SG, a decrease in the downward mobility of children from the middle SG, and a 
decrease in the size of the low SG.  
2) In the GE system: No change in the mobility to and from the upper SG, an increase in the 
size of the middle SG and no change in the size of the upper SG.  
3) In the unified system: a decrease in the downward mobility of children from the upper 
SG, an increase in the upward mobility of children from the middle SG, an increase in the 
size of the upper SG, and an ambiguous impact on the size of the middle SG. 
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Proposition 5. An increase in the per-student expenditure on the first level of tertiary 
education ( U  or 1U ) entails: 
1) In both systems: an increase in the upward mobility of children from the low SG, a 
decrease in the downward mobility of children from the middle skill group, and a 
reduction in the size of the low SG. 
2) In the GE system: an increase in the size of the middle SG and no change in the size of 
the upper SG.   
3) In the unified system:  no change in the mobility of the upper skill group, an increase in 
the size of the upper SG and an ambiguous effect on the size of the middle SG.  
6.3. Structural shifts in the long term 
Changes in the education structures modify the human capital achievements. Hence, family 
backgrounds are modified from the generation following that in which the structural shifts are 
implemented. Consequently, family backgrounds must be endogenized in the long term.   
So as to analyse the impacts of structural shifts in the long run, we firstly show that, for 
given characteristics, an education system tends towards a long term stratification with well-
defined human capital intervals for each skill groups. We subsequently analyse the impacts of 
changes in the structural characteristics (admission rules and expenditures) on the between-
group mobility and the size of each group.   
6.3.1. Stratification in the long term 
In what follows, we suppose that in both education systems the admission rules are effective 
but not exclusive, i.e., some individuals who wish to enter the related study are impeded by 
the admission rule, but not all of them.  
 
Proposition 6. The education dynamics tend towards a long-term stratification in which: 
1) the lower skill group is inside the human capital segment ,low low lowS h h    , the middle SG 
in the human capital segment ,mid mid midS h h     and the upper skill group in the segment
,up up upS h h    . 
2) The lower and upper limits of each segment are constant and fully determined by the 
education system (GE or unified) and on the effectiveness of the aptitude and admission 
constraints. 
Proof. Appendix F. The values jh  and jh , j = low, mid, up, are described in this appendix. 
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The location of all members of a skill group in the related segment does not prevent 
between-group mobility. In fact, the model can generate a large range of configurations as 
regards mobility in the long term (Appendix F): no mobility at all, the three SGs being fully 
insulated; mobility between one couple only of adjoining skill groups (2 configurations: low 
and middle SG or middle and upper SG); mobility between the adjoining SGs only (low and 
middle SG and middle and upper SG); mobility between all the skill groups. Analysing each 
of these configurations would be long, fastidious and of little interest (indications are given in 
Appendix F, and a more comprehensive analysis is available from the author upon request). 
We shall therefore focus on the most likely and most interesting situation for our subject, i.e., 
that in which there is mobility between the adjoining skill groups only, i.e., between the low 
and middle SG on the one hand and between the middle and upper SG on the other hand.   
6.3.2. Mobility and sizes of the skill groups in the long term 
In the GE system, the selections to enter the university and the GE operate at the end of basic 
education. Figure 3 depicts the children’s human capital at the end of basic education 
depending on the skill group where they are born. 
We denote ,  , ,
B
jh j low mid up , the human capital at the end of basic education of the 
child of the least skilled parent in the j skill group, provided that this child has the lowest 
aptitude a , and  
B
jh , the human capital at the end of basic education of the child of the parent 
with the highest possible human capital belonging to the  j skill group  provided that this child 
has the highest aptitude a . Then, all the children born in the low SG  have a human capital at 
the end of basic education inside segment ,B B Blow low lowS h h   
 , all those born in the middle SG 
have a human capital at the end of basic education inside segment ,B B Bmid mid midS h h   
, and all 
the children born in the upper SG possess a human capital at the end of basic education in 
segment ,B B Bup up upS h h   
. The limit values of these segments are described in Appendix F. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mobility in the GE system in the long term 
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As we have assumed that the three skill groups exist and that there is mobility between 
adjacent skill groups, then BlowS and 
B
midS  overlap ( )
B B
low midh h  as well as 
B
midS  and 
B
upS  
( B Bmid uph h ), and the admission threshold h  must be inside the interval ,
B B
mid lowh h  
. By 
construction, threshold h  is between 
B
uph  and 
B
midh .
14
 In Figure 3, the variations of these 
limits in relation to the three education expenditures are indicated (for instance, 
B
lowh  increases 
with B , and 
B
midh  increases with B  and U ).   
Note that individuals with personal aptitudes below Ua  prefer not to enter the university 
even if their human capital after basic education is above h . In contrast, as we have assumed 
that all the admitted enter the GE, all the individuals above h  enter the GE.  
In the unified system, the admission to U1 takes place at the end of basic education as in 
the GE system, but the admission to the highest level U2 now occurs at the end of U1. The 
impact of changes in the expenditures on the mobility between the low SG and the middle 
skill group is similar to that determined in the GE system. Figure 4 depicts the individuals’ 
human capital at the end of U1 depending on their families’ skill group.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mobility to the upper SG in the unified system in the long term 
 
The segment 1 1 1,U U Umid mid midS h h   
 gather the educational attainments of children from the 
low and middle skill groups at the end of U1, and the interval 1 1 1,U U Uup up upS h h   
 the 
educational attainments of children from the upper skill group at the end of U1. The values of 
the segments extremities are described in Appendix F. In Figure 4, the variations of the 
segments extremities with education expenditures on each study are indicated. Note that the 
students with an education attainment above h  and an aptitude lower than 2Ua  refuse to enter 
U2 (because of the incentive effect). These students normally come from the upper SG 
because the children from the middle SG with a human capital higher than h  at the end of U1 
typically have a high aptitude. 
                                                 
14
 Remember that h  changes from one generation to the next with the random distribution of aptitudes. 
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From the impacts of the changes in expenditures ( ,  , , 1, , 2j j B U U G U  ) on the human 
capital segments indicated in Figures 3 and 4 and on the aptitude thresholds ( 1 2,  ,  U U Ua a a ), 
we can establish the following three propositions (proofs in appendices G, H and I):  
 
Proposition 7. An increase in expenditures on basic education ( B ):  
1) In both systems: increases the upward mobility of children from the low SG, lowers the 
downward mobility of children from the middle SG, and lessens the size of the low SG. 
2) In the GE system: has no impact on the mobility to and from the upper SG and hence on 
the size of the upper SG and increases the size of the middle SG.   
3) In the unified system: increases the upward mobility of  children from the middle SG, 
decreases the downward mobility of the upper SG, augments the size of the upper SG, 
and has an ambiguous impact on the size of the middle SG.  
 
Proposition 8. An increase in expenditures on the lower level of tertiary education ( U , 1U ): 
1) In both systems: raises the upward mobility of children from the low SG, decreases the 
downward mobility of children from middle SG, increases the (absolute) upward mobility 
of children from middle SG, and lessens the size of the low SG. 
2) In the GE system: increases the downward mobility of children from the upper SG, 
increases the size of the middle SG and leaves unchanged the size of the upper SG.  
3) In the unified system: decreases the downward mobility of children from upper SG, raises 
the size of the upper SG, and has an ambiguous impact on the size of the middle SG.  
 
Proposition 9. An increase in the expenditure on the higher level of tertiary education ( G
and 2U ): 
1) In both systems: decreases the downward mobility of children from the upper SG. 
2) In the GE system: decreases the upward mobility of children from the middle SG and 
leaves unchanged the size of the upper SG. 
3) In the unified system: increases the upward mobility of children from the middle SG and 
increases the size of the upper skill group.   
 
The effects of changes in expenditures substantially differ between the two systems. These 
divergences are explained by the rules of admission to the highest level, i.e., the moment 
when the selection operates and the condition of admission (given number of intakes in the 
GE system vs. human capital threshold in the unified system): 
1. A rise in expenditure on basic education increases the educational attainment of all 
individuals without changing the human capital hierarchy across them. Hence, it increases the 
number of children who overtake both thresholds h  and h  in the unified system, increasing 
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thereby the intakes in both higher education levels, U1 and U2. In contrast, it only increases 
the number of university students in the GE system since the GEs’ intakes remain unchanged.  
2. A rise in expenditures on the first level of tertiary education boosts the admission to the 
highest level in the unified system since human capital increases for all students at the end of 
U1. In contrast, it has no impact on the intake of students in the GE system. In the long term, 
since parents in the middle skill group benefit from higher human capital, the rise in U  
increases their upward mobility, which increases the downward mobility of children from the 
upper SG since the number of intakes in given in the GEs. Note that, if the absolute upward 
mobility of children from the middle SG rises, this is not the case for the relative mobility 
(proportion of middle-SG children moving upwards) which tends to decrease
15
.   
3. Finally, a rise in expenditure on the highest level increases its intake of students in the 
unified system, both through the incentive effect for the children from the middle SG and 
through the decrease in downward mobility of children from the upper SG (their family 
background increases and thereby their human capital at the end of U1). In contrast, in the GE 
system, the decrease in the downward mobility of children from the upper SG (due to higher 
parents’ human capital and hence higher family backgrounds) is obtained at the expense of 
the upward mobility of children from the middle SG because the GEs’ intakes are unchanged.  
 
6.4. Simulations 
The analytical model has shown that, compared to the unified system, the GE system reduces 
both intergenerational mobility at the top and efficiency in human capital accumulation. 
However, the model does not reveal the magnitude of these reductions. In this purpose, we 
have implemented a series of simulations by selecting plausible values of the model 
parameters.
16
 All the simulations provide similar results, with however differences in intensity 
due to the differences in the values of the parameters. We thus present here the scenario which 
can be seen as medium in terms of aptitude interval (  ,a a ) and coefficient  . A larger 
aptitude interval increases the mobility and efficiency gaps between the two systems, and a 
higher   reduces these gaps. Table 1 depicts the coefficients selected in the simulations. 
We consider 500 dynasties over 11 successive generations. All the parents of generation 1 
(i.e., generation 0) are assumed to possess the same human capital (0.5) which is below the 
admission threshold 0.7h  , i.e, they all have a basic education only. This perfect equality at 
                                                 
15
 Proof in Brezis & Hellier (2013).  
16
 The simulations have been implemented using Mathematica8. 
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initial time 0 permits to focus on the sole combination of personal aptitudes and higher 
education structures in the long-term determining of social stratification and mobility. At each 
generation, aptitude is randomly distributed across dynasties in the interval    , 0.5,1a a  . 
Consequently, the individuals in generation 1 only differ in personal aptitudes and they select 
their education strategy according to the return to education and to the admission rules. The 
social distributions of the following generations are in addition impacted by family 
backgrounds since the parents’ human capital is subsequently uneven. 
 
Table 1. Parameters 
a  a  B  U , 1U  
1 2
    ,
U U
G
 
 h        
0.5 1 1 1 2.5 0.7 5% 0.5 0.33 
 
In equations (1)-(5), the coefficient   is the ‘structural’ human-capital intergenerational 
elasticity.
17
 We thus choose a coefficient (0.33) which is a mean of the IGEs estimated for 
advanced economies (simulations have also be implemented with 0.2   and 0.5  ). The 
admission share   is 5%, which is slightly above the share of the GEs’ admissions in France 
(about 4.5%, but medical studies are not pursued in GEs, with tight admission rules). G  is 
such that its contribution to human capital formation is 2.5 times higher than U . The other 
coefficients have been selected so as to obtain intergenerational variations in human capital 
attainment and distribution and in inequality which are in line with observed facts.  
Finally, so as to reveal the outcomes of the theoretical model, we assume that in both GE 
and unified systems (i) threshold h  and the amount   of students admitted in the upper level 
of tertiary education (G and U2) are identical, (ii) 1U U   and (iii) 1 2G U U    . 
For generations 2 to 11, Figure 5-a draws the proportion of children born in an upper SG 
family who enter the upper tertiary study (G or U2) and remain thereby in the upper SG in 
both systems. This is the upper SG self-reproduction rate and, as   is constant, this also 
provides the share of children from the upper SG in the GEs’ intakes of students. The dimmed 
surface corresponds to the systems being in its long term steady stratification. On average, the 
proportion of upper skilled born in upper skill group is 78% in the GE system against 62% in 
the unified system. Similarly, the number of children from the middle skilled group enrolled 
in the upper tertiary studies (G or U2) is on average 75% higher in the unified system than in 
                                                 
17
 The estimated coefficient can be higher or lower depending on whether the education system lessens or 
magnifies the structural effect of family backgrounds. 
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the GE system (Figure 5-b). These results show that, compared to the unified system, the GE 
system leads to a significant decrease in mobility at the top.   
 
Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
           
    
(a) Share of  Upper SG born children
         in the upper tertiary level
        (b) 
Number of  MSG - born children in U2 (Unified system)
Number of  MSG - born children in G (GE system)
Ratio  
 
In contrast, the difference between the two systems in terms of efficiency remains limited. 
From generations 3 to 11,
 18
  the unified system leads on average to an increase in human 
capital of 2.5% for the upper SG, and 0.2% for the whole population (and the average human 
capital of the middle SG is lessened by 0.04%). In consequence, the unified system generates 
a limited increase in the upper SG’s average educational attainment and the increase in the 
human capital of the total population is tiny. This stems from the low intakes in the upper 
level of tertiary education. More intakes make the united system to generate a larger increase 
in human capital. 
In summary, the simulations show that the GE system leads to (i) a significant loss in 
mobility at the top, (ii) a limited but non-negligible reduction in the human capital of the 
upper skill group and (ii) a tiny reduction in total human capital.  
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
A stylised model of the French higher education system (called GE system)  has been built 
and compared to a benchmark structure (called unified system) in which there is one type of 
establishment only, universities, with two successive levels (U1 and U2). The two systems 
essentially differ in their admission to the highest level. The divergence in outcomes between 
the two systems is notable: 
                                                 
18
 The first two generations are not considered given the influence of equality in human capital at initial time 0. 
 
                                            
GE System 
Unified system 
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1. For the admission to the highest level (G or U2) the unified system favours personal 
aptitudes and the GE system family backgrounds, which restrains intergenerational mobility 
in the latter (Propositions 1 and 3).  
2.  An increase in the budget for basic education increases the upward mobility to both U1 
and U2 in the unified system, whereas it only increases the intakes in the university, but not in 
the GEs, in the GE system (Propositions 4 and 7). 
3.  In the long term, a rise in the budget of the highest level (G or U2) lessens mobility in 
the GE system and it raises the intakes of students in the highest level in the unified system. 
This makes a larger proportion of the population accede the upper SG in the unified system, 
whereas it favours the self-reproduction and insulation of elites in the GE system (Prop. 9).   
4. The unified system results in higher human capital in the upper skill group and higher 
average human capital in the population that the GE system (Proposition 2). 
In summary, the GE system lessens both mobility and human capital accumulation, and it 
tends to foster the self-reproduction and insulation of a narrow elite. This is typically not what 
was intended by its instigators who wished to promote meritocracy and personal aptitudes. 
The analysis developed here shows that this objective has not been reached and that the GE 
system has quite the opposite favoured the influence of family backgrounds. Moreover, these 
results are in line with the empirical evidence that stratified education systems and early 
selection reduces equality of opportunity (e.g., Horn, 2009). 
It must however be emphasized that the pro-family backgrounds and anti-mobility 
orientation of the GE system has been diagnosed in relation to a benchmark system with one 
type of establishment only and a two-level tertiary education. Is this system representative of 
what is observed in other countries? 
The difference between the GE system and the unified system is essentially twofold. First, 
the selective admission is made earlier, which favours the influence of family backgrounds. 
Second, the number of intakes is discretionarily decided and limited by the GEs themselves, 
whereas intakes are endogenously determined by the number of students with a human capital 
higher than h  at the end of U1 in the unified system. Hence, a general skill upgrading 
increases the intakes in the highest level in the unified system, but not in the GE system.  
There is in fact a simple way to generate a GE system from an apparently unified system. 
This consists (i) in differentiating the universities in terms of their human capital requirement 
at the end of basic education ( h  differs across universities) and (ii) in increasing the required 
level for the most prestigious establishments so as to maintain a limited number of intakes. 
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This is what has been observed in the US and the UK. In the US, the admission to colleges 
depends on one’s SAT19 score at the end of high school. Hoxby (2009) shows that the SAT 
scores for the admission to colleges have increased in the most selective and decreased in the 
others from 1962 to 2007. In addition, Su et al. (2012) report that, contrary to the general 
move, the intake of students has not increased much in the selective colleges. 
It can also be noted that the way to prevent the lower human capital attainment of the 
upper skill group in the GE system consists in increasing the per-student expenditure on the 
highest education level. This is what is observed in countries like France and the US. We have 
shown that this leads to an even lower mobility and to the self-reproduction of a narrow elite. 
In contrast with the US and UK, higher education is closer to the unified system in 
Scandinavia and to a lesser extent in Germany. Even if there are differences in quality 
between universities, (i) these differences are not too large, (ii) the first level (bachelor) is 
quite comparable across establishments, (iii) the differentiation typically takes place in the 
superior levels (master or PhD level), (iv) the excellence is distributed across universities 
depending on the field of study, and (v) the divergence in terms of per-student expenditure is 
significantly lower than in France, the US and the UK.  
From our diagnosis, it is finally possible to question the possible reform of the GE system. 
The pro-family background and anti-mobility specificity of this system is based on (i) the 
early selection to enter the GEs, (ii) their admission of a pre-determined number of students 
and (iii) their high per-student expenditure compared to the university. Hence, an increase in 
mobility could be achieved by relaxing these features. For instance, replacing the classes 
préparatoires by the university bachelor level, to which a special concours opened to the best 
students with a bachelor degree would be added, could postpone the admission to the GEs and 
foster the weight of personal aptitude to the detriment of family background, increasing 
thereby mobility and educational efficiency. By doing this, an increase in the funding on the 
bachelor level (U1 in our model) would also benefit the GEs’ students, which permits then to 
lessen the expenditure on the GEs.  In fact, several steps towards a recruitment by other ways 
than the traditional classes préparatoires have already been opened, but those additional 
procedures remain limited in most GEs. Obviously, the most direct way would be to replace 
the GE system by a unified system, but a large part of the French deciders could oppose such 
a reform because they come from the GEs.                   
                                                 
19
 Standardised test for college admission in the US implemented at the end of high school.  
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Finally, the scope of our findings can be extended to the analysis of higher education 
systems in general. The French Grandes écoles are typical examples of what Turner (1960) 
calls a selective education system and the GE system developed in this paper provides a 
synthetic model of such a structure. In addition our two-level unified system can be seen as a 
framework modelling Turner’s comprehensive education system, provided that h  is not too 
high. In this respect, our model and results give credence to Kerckhoff’s proposition that the 
impact of family backgrounds is magnified when the education system is highly stratified and 
selective (Kerckhoff, 1995). And, as usual, higher family backgrounds come with lower 
intergenerational mobility. Hence, the approach developed in this paper can be interpreted as 
modelling Turner’s distinction and presenting an analytical demonstration of Kerckhoff’s 
proposition.    
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Appendix A. Determination of the aptitude thresholds 
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By writing 
rE e and  denoting ‘ ’ the relation ‘is preferred to’: 
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It can be easily verified that there are only two possible cases, 2 2/ 1U U B Ua a a   and 
1 2/ 2U U B Ua a a  , because the others violate transitivity.
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Appendix B. The case 2 2/ 1U U B Ua a a   
Figure B1 depicts the distribution of individuals between the different studies and 
education groups when 2 2/ 1U U B Ua a a  .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1. Distribution of students in the unified system with 
2 2/ 1U U B Ua a a  .  
 
The curves 1A  and 2A  are identical to those in Figure 2 but the optimal choice 
corresponding to abilities differs.
21
 As previously, the dotted surface depicts the set of 
individuals who do not enter the university, the dimmed surface those who attend U1 only, 
and the lined surface depicts those who enter U2.  
 
Appendix C. Personal aptitude vs. family background 
Before demonstrating Propositions 1 and 2, we firstly build Figure C1 on which the proofs 
will be based. This figure will also be utilised in Appendix D and E. 
Figure C1 depicts the individuals defined by their two characteristics, personal aptitude a 
on the x-axis and family background 1th   on the y-axis. The figure identifies the spaces 
related to each skill group of origin (parents) and each skill group of destination (children). 
The lower, middle and upper SGs are respectively denoted LSG, MSG and USG. 
Both education systems are inserted in Figure C1, with the assumptions indicated in 
Section 5: 1) similar admission tightness (same h  and same number of intakes in G and U2) 
                                                 
21
 2 2/ 1 1 2it U U B Ua a a a B U U    ; 2 2/ 1 2 1U it U B Ua a a a B U U    ;  
2 2/ 1 2 1U U B it Ua a a a U B U    ; 2 2/ 1 2 1U U B U ita a a a U U B    . 
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in both systems; 2) similar expenditures (same B , 1U U   and 1 2G U U    ) in both 
systems; 3) identical cross-distribution of the attributes  1,it ita h   across individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C1. Determination of the individuals’ skill groups in both systems 
 
The figure is constructed in the case 1 2U U G Ua a a a a a     . Equalities 1U Ua a  
and 2G Ua a  respectively derive from equalities 1U U    and 1 2G U U    , given the 
values ,   , 1, , 2ja j U U G U  provided by relations (6), (7), (9) and (10). Inequality 
1U Ua a a   means that there are individuals who prefer basic education to the first level of 
tertiary education and inequality 2G Ua a a   that there are individuals who prefer the 
second level of tertiary education to the first.  The case 2 1G U U Ua a a a a a      is not 
treated here because it leads to similar results (available from the author upon request).  
We suppose that all admission rules are effective (some children are not admitted) and that 
they do not prevent all the applicants to enter the related study.  
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The threshold values defining the individuals’ optimal choices without admission 
constraints, ,   , 1, , 2ja j U U G U , are on the x-axis. The variation of the thresholds ja s  in 
relation to the js  are indicated below each ja . 
The limits corresponding to the parents’ human capital (family backgrounds) and related to 
each skill group are on the y-axis. The parents’ human capital are located inside the interval 
min max,j SG j SGh h   
 for the parents in the j-SG, j = low, middle, upper. 
To enter U (in the GE system) or U1 (in the unified system), an individual must be located 
in the right hand side of 1U Ua a  and above the curve 1UA A . To enter G (in the GE 
system) or U2 (in the unified system), an individual must be located in the right hand side of 
2G Ua a  and above the curve GA  in the GE system, and 2A  (different from GA ) in the 
unified system, with  
1/ /
1( ) ( ) /U BA a A a h a
     ,  
Proof of Proposition 1  
As depicted in Figure C1, the curves  
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and 2( )A a  is above (resp. 
under) ( )GA a  for ˆa a  (resp. ˆa a ). 
Let   
1/
max
, /t B USGa h h

  be the aptitude at which ( )GA a  intersects the line 
max
1t USGh h  .
22
  
Let ( )SD  be the number of intakes in study , , 1, 2S U G U U . ( ) ( 2)G UD D  by 
assumption. 
If aˆ a , then  2( ) ( ),   ,GA a A a a a a   There are more intakes in U2 than in G. 
If aˆ a , then  2( ) ( ),   ,GA a A a a a a     There are more intakes in G than in U2. 
Hence, for ( ) ( 2)G UD D , we must have: ˆa a a  .  
In addition, for  ˆ ,a a a , it is straightforward that, for a given value of   and hence h , 
ˆ( ) ( 2) ( )a U G  D D  is a monotonically decreasing function of aˆ  (i.e., a monotonically 
decreasing function of h ) with ( ) 0a   and ( ) 0a  . There is hence a unique ˆ *a a , and 
thereby a unique *h h , such that ( *) 0 ( 2) ( )a U G   D D . 
The value *h  is the admission threshold to U2 which ensures that ( ) ( 2)G UD D . 
From the admission curves ( )GA a  and 2 ( )A a , we define two sets of individuals:  
                                                 
22
     
1/
1/
max / max
, ,/ /USG t B t B USGh h a a h h
  
  
   . 
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1) Those situated between  GA  and 2A  with an aptitude lower than aˆ   who are admitted to 
the highest level (G) in the GE system but are not admitted to the highest level (U2) in the 
unified system. Those individuals are in the set H1 in Figure C1. 
2)  Those situated between 2A   and GA  with an aptitude higher than aˆ  who are admitted to 
the highest level (U2) in the unified system but are not admitted to the highest level (G) in the 
GE system. Those individuals are in the set 2H  in Figure C1. 
From Figure C1, it is clear that: 
1) All the individuals admitted to G but not to U2 have a lower aptitude and a higher 
family background than all those admitted to U2 but not to G. 
2) Corollary: all the individuals admitted to U2 but not to G have a higher aptitude and a 
lower family background than all those admitted to G and not to U2. 
Hence, the unified system is strictly aptitude-biased compared to the GE system, and the GE 
system is strictly family background-biased compared to the unified system.  
 
Appendix D. Human capital level 
 
We show that: 
1) The individuals in the upper SG have a higher human capital in the unified system than in 
the GE system. 
2) The total and average human capital is higher in the unified system than in the GE system. 
 
1) Moving from the GE to the unified system makes a number of individuals who entered G 
not to enter U2 (individual inside the space H1 in Figure C1) and an equal number of 
individuals who did not enter G to enter U2 (individuals inside the space H2 in Figure C1). To 
establish Proposition 2, we show that, for any pair of individuals 1 2( , )j i H H   , the human 
capital at the end of the top level of tertiary education is higher for individual i than for 
individual j.  
Consider individual (i,t) who enter U2 and not G, and (j,t) who enters G and not U2. Then: 
1 1(1 ) (1 )
B B
U it it U jt jta h h a h      and 
B B
jt ith h h  , which implies it jta a . Then: 
1
1 1
1 21
1 2 1 1 2
1 2 1
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B
jtB B U it
BU it it U jt jt B jtU U itU jt it
B
U U it U it U U jt it
it jt
U U jt U jt
ha
a h a h
haa h
a a a h
a a
a a

 
 
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  

    
   
      
   
 
As 1 2U U G    : 1 2(1 ( ) ) (1 )
B B
U U it it G jt jta h a h       
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Consequently, any individual (i,t) who enter U2 and not G has a higher human capital at 
the conclusion of U2 than any (j,t) who enters G and not U2 at the end of G. As the number of 
individual (i,t) who enter U2 and not G is equal to the number of those entering G and not U2, 
the human capital in the upper SG is higher in the unified system than in the GE system.  
 
2) All individuals have the same human capital in both systems, except those in the spaces 
1H  and 2H  (Fig. B1). Let K be the amount of human capital in both systems outside 1 2.H H     
Consider individual i in 2H  (she attains the top level in the unified system and not in the GE 
system). Her human capital at the conclusion of education is:  
in the unified system:   1 2(1 ( ) )
B
U U it ita h    
in the GE system:   1(1 )
B
U it ita h  
Consider individual j in 1H  (she attains the top level in the GE and not in the unified system). 
Her human capital at the conclusion of education is:  
in the unified system:   1(1 )
B
U jt jta h  
in the GE system:   1 2(1 ( ) )
B
U U jt jta h    
As 1 1(1 ) (1 )
B B
U it it U jt jta h h a h      and 
B B
jt ith h h  , we have for any 2 1( , )i j H H  : 
0B Bit it jt jta h a h  ,
23
 and hence: 
2 2
0B Bit it jt jt
i H i H
a h a h
 
   . 
The total human capital in the unified system is:
2 1
1 2 1(1 ( ) ) (1 )
B B
U U it it U jt jt
i H j H
K a h a h  
 
      . 
The total human capital in the GE system is: 
2 1
1 1 2(1 ) (1 ( ) )
B B
U it it U U jt jt
i H j H
K a h a h  
 
      . 
The difference between the two is 
2 2
2 0
B B
U it it jt jt
i H i H
a h a h
 
 
  
 
 
  , which shows that the 
total human capital is higher in the unified than in the GE system.   
 
Appendix E. Structural shifts in the short term 
 
The short term analysis is based on the variations in thresholds ja  and in curves jA  in relation 
to ,   , , 1, , 2j j B U U G U  , and to h ,   and h . 
Proof of Proposition 4. As depicted in Figure C1, an increase in B : 
                                                 
23
 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) ( ) 0 0
B B B B B B B B
U it it U jt jt U it it jt jt jt it it it jt jta h a h a h a h h h a h a h             . 
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1) displaces curves UA  and 1A  downwards ( 1/ 0,  / 0U B BA A       ). These moves (i) 
increase the upward mobility of children from the low SG and shrink thereby the size of the 
low SG, (ii) reduce the downward mobility of children from the middle SG and expands 
thereby the size of the middle SG, and (iii) lessen the downward mobility to the low SG of 
children from the upper skill group and expand thereby the size of the middle SG.  
2) displaces curve 2A  downwards ( 2 / 0BA    ), which increases the upward mobility of 
children from the middle SG and lessens the downward mobility of children from the upper 
SG in the unified system. This reduces the size of the middle SG and increases the size of the 
upper SG. 
3) has no impact on the curve GA . This is because (i) an increase in B  has no impact on 
the hierarchy of human capital across children at the end of basic education and (ii) the 
number of children admitted to the GEs ( ) remains unchanged.  
Note that all these moves are linked to the admission effect (the increase in B  makes the 
admission to U, U1 and U2 easier). 
Proof of Proposition 5. An increase in the per-student expenditure on the first level of tertiary 
education ( U  or 1U ): 
1) displaces Ua  and 1Ua  to the left ( 1 1/ 0,  / 0U UU Ua a       ), which increases the 
upward mobility of children from the low SG and reduces the downward mobility of children 
from the middle SG, shrinking thereby the low SG and expanding the middle SG. 
2) displaces Ga  and 2Ua  to the right ( 2 1/ 0,  / 0G UU Ua a       ). This has no impact 
on the mobility between the middle and the upper skill groups in the GE system because all 
the admitted enter the GEs (the curve GA is always at the right hand side of the vertical 
Ga a  for 
max
USGh h )
24
. In the unified system, this reduces the number of children who wish 
to enter the GEs from both the middle and upper SG. 
3) has no impact on GA  and displaces 2A  to the left. This latter move releases the 
admission constraint to enter U2, which tends to increase the upward mobility of children 
from the middle SG and to reduces the downward mobility of children from the upper SG.  
In the unified system, the impact on mobility between the middle and the upper skill group 
depends on the opposite effects linker to impact of 1U  on 2Ua  and on 2A .   
                                                 
24
 Note that without assuming that all the admitted students enter the GE, the increase in 
U
 could foster the mobility to and 
from the upper SG through the incentive effect (because / 0
G U
a    ). 
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Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 6 
 
The steady segments related to each education function (locus of the steady states of each 
function for all  ,a a a ) are firstly defined. The human capital segments corresponding to 
each skill group in the long term are subsequently defined and shown to be constant in each 
possible configuration of effectiveness of the aptitude and admission constraints. 
Consider a given aptitude a. The education functions (1)-(5) can be written: 
 1( ) ,( ) ( ) jit j jit B jh a ah a a     A A                (A1) 
with         1 1 20, , , , ( ) ,    , , , 1, 2j U B G B U B U U B j B U G U U          . 
The steady state of function (A1) is  
1/(1 )ˆ ( ) ( )j jh a a

 A and it is stable since 1  . 
 As  ,a a a , the j-steady segment    
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
( ) , ( ), jj jj jS a ah h
         
A A  is the 
locus of all the steady states corresponding to study j.  
As aptitudes are randomly distributed across individuals (i.i.d) at each generation, one dynasty 
which perpetually remains in study j jumps from one point inside jS  to another depending on 
each generation’s aptitude once this dynasty has reached the steady segment. All the dynasties 
within study j then enter sooner or later the j-steady segment and subsequently remain inside 
this segment. After calculation, the steady segments are: 
   
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
, ,BB B B BS h h a a
   
  
     
 
 
   
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
, ( ) , ( )U U U B U B US h h a a a a
     
  
    

 

 
   
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
, ( ) , ( )G G G B G B GS h h a a a a
     
  
    

 

 
   
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
1 1 1 1 1, ( ) , ( )U U U B U B US h h a a a a
     
  
    



  
     
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
2 2 2 1 2 1 2, ( ) , ( )U U U B U U B U US h h a a a a
 
      
  
     



  
However, the dynasties do not perpetually pursue the same study. They can go up or down the 
education ladder, depending on their wishes (the aptitude constraints) and on the admission 
constraints.  
Suppose that there is a segment of human capital for each skill group, in which all the 
members of this skill group are located in the long term. We denote lowS , midS  and upS   this 
segment for the low SG, the middle SG and the upper SG respectively.   
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If they exist, these segments gS , g = low, mod, up depend (i) on the education functions (1)-
(5), (ii) on the aptitude constraints (Lemma 1 for the GE system and Lemma 2 for the unified 
system) and (iii) on the admission constraints h  and   or  h   (depending on the higher 
education system). Hence, these segments depend on whether the last two sets of constraints 
are effective or nor. A constraint is ineffective if it has no impact on the individuals’ choice. 
  
We now show that the segments gS , g = low, mod, up, do exist in each higher education 
system, which establishes Proposition 6. 
 
The GE system 
The aptitude constraints are it Ua a  to enter U and it Ga a to enter G, and the admission 
constraints are Bith h   to enter U and ( )
B
ith h t  to enter G. The constraint it Ga a  is 
always ineffective by assumption and the constraint ( )Bith h t  is always effective by 
definition. We shall thus focus on the aptitude constraint it Ua a  and the admission 
constraint Bith h . 
We consider the long term. Consequently, the admission constraint Bith h  is effective in the 
long term iif there are always children whose human capital at the end of basic education is 
below Bith . When the admission constraint is ineffective in the long term, lowS  vanishes in the 
long term.  
1) If both constraints are non-effective, it is clear that the long term stratification is comprised 
of 2 SGs, the middle and upper SG, with ,mid U U US S h h       and ,up G G GS S h h
     . This 
is the case when two conditions are fulfilled:  
(i)  Ua a , which ensures that the aptitude condition is always fulfilled, and  
(ii) Bh h  and Uh h , which ensures that lowS  vanishes in the long term. First,  Bh h   
ensures that any dynasty inside BS  will sooner or later fulfil the admission condition to enter 
U. Second, for lowS  to vanish, we must additionally have all the dynasties inside the middle 
SG to enter U. The lowest possible human capital at the end of schooling of an individual who 
enter U is 1(1 )U a h
  , corresponding to a a , and the lowest possible human capital of 
her child at the end of basic education (corresponding to the child aptitude a ) is 
1(1 )B Ua a h
      . For this child to admitted in U, we must have 
 
1/(1 )
1(1 ) ( )B U B U Ua a h h h a a h
        

      , and hence  Uh h . 
Hence, when both constraints are non-effective: 
lowS   ; midS   US  
   
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
, ( ) , ( )up up up G B G B GS h h S a a a a
     
         


  
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2) If in the long term the aptitude constraint is non effective ( Ua a ) and the admission 
constraint is effective (there are always individuals with Bith h ) , the only condition to enter 
U is Bith h  and the lowest possible human capital at the end of U is 
1(1 )U a h
  . Then: 
 
1/(1 )
, ,low low low BS h h ha

 
     
 
, 
 
1/(1 )
1, (1 ) , ( )mid mid mid U B US h h a h a a
   

       
 
,  
,up up up GS h h S     
3) If in the long term the aptitude constraint is effective ( Ua a ) and the admission constraint 
is non-effective (all individuals are such that ,  ,Bith h i t   in the long term), the sole condition 
to enter U is Bith h  and the lowest possible human capital at the end of U is in the long term 
 
1/(1 )
B U B U Ua a
  

 , which corresponds to the steady state of function  
1( ) ( )
U
it U ithh a

 A  for Ua a . Then: 
   
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
,B B Ulow aS a
   
  
  
 
, 
   
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
,mid B U B U U B B US a a a a
       
 
 
 
  
 
,  
     
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
, ,   max ,up B B G B B G U GS a a a a a a a
       
  
  

 

 
4) If both the aptitude and admission constraints are effective, then, following the above-
exposed reasoning, we have: 
 
1/(1 )
, ,low low low BS h h ha

 
     
 
, 
 
1/(1 )
1, (1 ) ,mid mid mid U U B B US h h a h a a
    

       
 
,  
     
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
, ,   max ,up B B G B B G U GS a a a a a a a
       
  
  

 

 
The Unified system 
To simplify, we shall suppose now that (i) the aptitude constraint is ineffective to enter U2, 
and (ii) the admission constrain is effective to enter U2. This means that all the students 
admitted to U2 ( 1Uith h ) do enter U2. This is the case when the admission rule is not lenient.  
Then, the four cases in terms of h -constraint and Ua -constraint exposed in the study of the 
GE system must be considered, but the segments midS  and upS  are now modified by the 
admission constraint 1Uith h . In the four cases, the related lowS  and  midh   (the lower limit of 
segment midS ) are unchanged (replacing however U  by 1U ) ,  but the values of midh  and 
upS  are now because of the effectiveness of the admission constraint h : 
 midh h  
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  
1 1/(1 )
1 2
1 21
1
1 )
, )
1
(
(U Uup B B U U
U
a
S h a a
a
 

 
   

 

 
  
 

 

 
 
Human capital at the end of basic education and at the end of U1
25
 
The segments of human capital after basic education of the children born in each skill group 
(low, mid, up) are in each of the above-determined four cases: 
   , ,B B Blow low low B low B lowS h h a h a h
     
    
 
   , ,B B Bmid mid mid B mid B midS h h a h a h
     
    
 
   , ,B B Blow up up B up B upS h h a h a h
      
    
 
As the thee admission constraints are effective, the segments of human capital at the end of 
U1 in which stand the children from the middle SG ( 1UmidS ) and from the upper SG (
1U
upS ) are: 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1, (1 ) ,(1 )
U U U
low low low U U BS h h a h a a h
            
   
 
 1 1 1
/(1 )
1/(1 )2
1 1 1 21
1
, ( ) 1 ,( ) ( )U U Uup up up
U
U B U U U B
U
S h h a a h a a a a
a

 
    

 



 



  
         
      
 
 
 
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 7 
 
Relation (1) implies / 0,
B
i Bh i    . 
As B  increases with Ua , 1Ua  and h  is unchanged, more children from the low, the middle 
and the upper SG enter U (and U1), and all the children who would have entered U (and U1) 
without increase in B  can still do it. This establishes feature 1 of Proposition 7. 
As regards the entry to GE, the rise in B  increases the human capital attainment at the end of 
basic education of all children without modifying their ranking. Hence, the   children with 
the highest human capital at the end of basic education are unchanged and, as   is constant, 
there is no modification in the GEs’ intakes. This establishes feature 2 of Proposition 7. 
                                                 
25
 Note that the individuals with 
B
ith h  and 2it Ua a  do not enter U2. We suppose here that h  is large 
enough to prevent such cases. It can be easily seen from Figure B1 that, as we have assumed that 
Ga a , the 
admission rule 
B
ith h  should be very lenient compared to the admission ( )G D  to have 1Uh h .     
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As regards the entry in U2, as 
1
0,  
U
i
B
h
i


 

 admitted in U1 (Relation 4) and as 2Ua  and h  
are unchanged, more children from the middle and the upper SG enter U2 and all the children 
who would have entered U2 without increase in B  still do it. This establishes feature 3 of 
Proposition 7. The ambiguous effect on the size of the middle SG stems from the combination 
of its increase due to the larger number of intakes in U1 and its reduction due to those 
entering U2.    
 
Appendix H. Proof of Proposition 8 
 
 (a) As 0U
U
a




 and 1
1
0U
U
a




, rises in U  or/and 1U  increase the upward mobility of 
children from the low SG, and decrease in the downward mobility of children from the middle 
SG in both systems. This entails a reduction in the size of the low SG. This establishes feature 
1 of Proposition 8, which is reinforced by the increase in human capital off all the parents in 
the middle SG due to the rises in U  and 1U , which make less of their children to fall in the 
low SG because of the unchanged admission threshold h . 
(b) / 0G Ua    , 2 1/ 0U Ua      rises in U  and/or 1U  increase the upward mobility 
of children from the middle SG in the unified system, but not in the GE system (all the 
students admitted to G enter G by assumption). 
(c) In the GE system, the increase in U  moves upward the human capital of all the parents 
in the middle SG, which make some of their children overtake certain children from the upper 
SG at then of basic education (because of the increase in the family backgrounds of children 
from the middle SG) and make thereby some of them to enter the GE, and the same number of 
children from the upper SG to fail entering the GE, compared to the situation without increase 
in U . This establishes feature 2 of Proposition 8.  
(d) In the unified system, the increase in 1U moves upward the human capital of all the 
parents in the middle and the upper SG (the segment lowS  and upS  move upwards) and, for a 
given h , increases the upward mobility of children from the middle SG and lessens the 
downward mobility of children from the upper SG, expanding thereby the size of the upper 
SG. This establishes feature 3 of Proposition 8. 
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Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 9 
 
An increase in G  augments the human capital level of all individuals who enter a GE, and 
thereby of parents in the upper SG. The segment GS  moves upwards. As the human capital 
level of parents from the upper SG raises compared to that of the middle SG, more children 
from the upper SG and less from the middle SG are admitted in the GE (since   is given), 
which signifies a decrease in the downward mobility of children from the upper skill group 
(feature 1 of Proposition 9) and a decrease in the upward mobility of children from the middle 
SG (feature 2 of proposition 9).  
As 2 2/ 0U Ua    , an increase in 2U  lowers threshold , which incite more children born in 
the middle SG to entre U2 (incentive effect). The increase in 2U  lessens the downward 
mobility of children from the upper SG because their parents have more human capital (which 
entails a higher gamily backgrounds). This establishes feature 1 of proposition 9.  In addition, 
the decrease in 2Ua  incites more children born in the middle SG to enter U2.This expands the 
size of the upper SG. Both results establish feature 3 of Proposition 9. 
